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ABSTRACT
This paper utilizes a survey of the US manufacturing firms from 1832 to
investigate the structure ofmanufacturinginvestment during early industria1
ization. Althoughseveral manufacturing industries, suchascotton textiles,
departfrom the pattern, most appear to havedevotedthe hulkoftheir
investmentsto working capitaL This variation acrossindustries in the
compositionof capital investmentsis indicative of a more generalvariation
in factor intensities, and bears on the issues ofwhy industries became
concentratedin theregions theydid, and the degrees to which theywere
adverselyaffected by the limited availability of longtenn loansEvidence
that most manufacturing industries had quite modest investments in machinery
and tools per unit of labor is also presented, servIng to undercut the notion
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Economic historians have long been concerned with the absolute and
relative amounts of investment by manufacturers in fixed and working capital
during the early stages of industrialization. The question that has, perhaps,
most directly attracted them to the subject has been how closely industrial
development was related to the introduction of sophisticated machineryand
production processes that were highly intensive in fixed capital. It has also
been argued, however, that the division of investment between fixed and
working (or circulating) capital has an important bearing on the issue of the
extent to which industrial expansion might have been impeded by the
organization of financial markets.' Pollard, in particular, suggested that
the bulk of investment in early manufacturing took the form of circulating
capital, and that the growth of this sector was accordingly not substantially
hindered by limited access to sources of long—term credit.2 In his view,
merchants and other traditional suppliers of short—term credit could finance
the working capital, which was relatively liquid and turned over rapidly,
leaving only a modest share of manufacturing investment to be raised through
equity and long—term loans,
Most scholars who have studied the division of investment in
manufacturing between fixed and working capital have had to rely predominantly
on the individual records of firms. Although such bodies of evidence are rich
and detailed, the cost of retrieving them is high, and has restricted investi-
gators to the experiences of a relatively small number of establishments. A
recently collected sample from the 1832 McLane Report, however, contains
information for a large cross—section of northeastern firms on the composition
of their capital investments,3 The U.S. Treasury Department survey of manu-
factures, from which these data were drawn, was marred by several defects,
such as variation across geographic areas in the quality of coverage and the2
format of the questionnaire administered. Nevertheless, the 1194 firms
included in the sample encompass a broad spectrum of manufacturing industries,
establishment sizes, and locations. Careful analysis of this body of evidence
can yield much insight into the operations of manufacturingfirms and
financial markets during the initial phase of industrialization in the U.S.
One of the problems associated with employing the McLane Report data is
that the categories used by enumerators to decompose investment do not always
conform to modern concepts of what constitutes fixed and working capital,and
their various subeomponents. An already alluded to diffIculty of this sortis
that firms in Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and the Middle Atlantic states were
surveyed with a different questionnaire than were those in Massachusetts,
Maine, Vermont, and Connecticut. Establishments from theformer set of states
(henceforth referred to as Group I) decomposed their capital investmentsinto
two components, "capital invested in ground and buildings,and water power,
and in machinery" and the "average amount in materials, and in cashfor the
purchase of materials, and payment of wages." Those fromthe latter areas
(Group II) distinguished between the "value of real estate, buildings,and
fixtures, occupied and used for the business," the "value of tools,machinery,
and apparatus other than the fixtures," and the "value of average stock on
hand, and in the process of manufacture." Thus, all enumeratorsfor the 1832
survey appear to have been operating with similarinstructions as to what
sorts of fixed assets should be classified together, althoughthose working
with Group II firms provided more detail by dividing such assets into two
classes. Their understanding of fixed capital resembles the modern one,and
evidence seems to support the view that their measure of the former was a good
approximation of thelatter.43
As for the treatment of working capital, enumerators appear to have only
surveyed firms on the value of their inventories, and omitted the other major
component of this type of capital, accounts receivable or the credit extended
to customers.5 Fortunately, additional information reported by most of the
Group II establishments surveyed allows this important component of working
capital to be estimated at the firm level. About 300 establishments revealed
the proportions of their output sold for cash, for credit, or for barter, and
if for credit, at what average term. By fitting regressions with the propor—
tion of output sold on credit arid the average term of credit as the dependent
variables over the data for the reporting firms, predicted values of the
variables were generated for the other observations. Under the assumption
that the manufacturing establishments had been maintaining constant levels of
output and credit extension, firm—level estimates of the average accounts
receivable were computed from the following expression:
AR =(PC-Q)(T/12)
where AR is accounts receivable, PC is the proportion of output sold on
credit, Q is the value of annual output, and T is the average term (in
months) of the credit extended. Given that the levels of production and sales
are likely to have varied seasonally, the average accounts receivable
estimated by this procedure, as well as the average level of inventories
reported by firms, may be significantly different from the actual monthly
investments made in these components of working capital. Whether, and how,
this variation around the mean should influence the interpretation of the
quantitative results is unclear, and remains to be determined. Seasonality
might also affect the estimated patterns by encouraging investment in working
capital, relative to that in fixed capital.4
The percentages of the total investment accounted for by the various
categories of capital have been calculated for selected industries from the
1832 sample, and are presented, by group, in Table 1. Also reported for the
Group II establishments are estimates of the total capital investment per
equivalent worker and of the investment in tools and machinery per equivalent
worker. The results suggest that working capital attracted a substantial
share of the investments made by manufacturing firms. When credit extended to
customers (accounts receivable) is included in the estimate of the total
capital investment, the working capital share ranges between 40.6 and 65.6
percent across the six Group I industries, and between 37.6 and 88.7 percent
across the eight in Group 11.6 The significance of these figures is
buttressed by the recognition that the relative importance of working capital
would be understated if some finns reported the gross value of their capital
stock, rather than the net value.
One of the most interesting features of these estimates is the
covariation across industries of the working capital share with the level of
total capital per unit of labor. The three most capital—intensive industries,
such as cotton textiles, wool textiles, and paper, have relatively low working
capital shares, between 37.6 and 53.3 percent among the Group II firms. Work-
ing capital accounts for higher proportions of the total investment in the
other industries, between 53.6 and 88.7 percent among the same group of
establishments. The sizes of individual establishments also vary between the
two classes of industries, with the average plants in the more capital—
intensive industries (especially textiles) being much larger than those from
the latter group.7 Thus, the evidence seems to favor distinguishing between
manufacturing industries with respect to their demand for long—term capital.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These estimates are weighted averages computed over all of the firms in
the 1832 sample that supplied the relevant information, with the exceptions of
firms that reported no investment in structures and land, no investment in
machinery and tools (a requirement which excludes a number of putting—out
enterprises in shoes), or operating fewer than seven months a year. The
principal criteria for including industries in this table were a sufficient
number of observations and a relatively homogeneous set of outputs. The
industries are ordered by the value of machinery and tools per equivalent
worker. The number of equivalent workers is equal to the sum of the number of
adult male employees, four—tenths times the number of female and child
employees, and 1 (representing the entrepreneur's labor input). The figures
within parentheses represent the numbers of observations of Group I and Group
II firms over which the estimates on the respective lines were computed. The
numbers of observations differ between those estimates computed with and those
without credit, because some firms did not report the value of their output.
The estimated values of the proportion of output sold on credit and the
average term of credit were computed from regressions fitted over those
observations that reported on these variables. Included as independent
variables in these regressions were the log of the number of employees and
industry dummy variables.6
have had greater relative, and much greater absolute, demands for long—term
funds than their counterparts in other industries, because on average a
greater share of their investment went to fixed capital, more investment
capital was utilized for each unit of their labor, and more units of labor
were employed by them. Pollard's claim that manufacturers during early
industrialization were less dependent on supplies of long—term capital than
has generally been recognized might apply in the U.S. case to textiles. It
seems, however, to more accurately characterize other industries.
Another implication of the data on Group 11 firms is that, with the
exception of cotton textiles, the capital invested in machinery and tools
amounted to only a small fraction of the total investment.8 In all other
industries, the value of the buildings, land, and fixtures far outweighed that
of machinery and tools. Although machinery and tools attracted nearly 30
percent of the capital invested by the cotton textile establishments, one
cannot fail to be impressed by the relative insignificance of this category of
investment when the second—most mechanized industry, wool textiles, barely
manages a 14 percent share. The industry—specific estimates of the value of
machinery and tools per equivalent worker lend further support to this
judgment. The figure for cotton textiles is $656.4, more than twice as large
as that for wool textiles, and more than ten times the figures for coaches!
harnesses, tanning, hats, furniture/woodwork, and shoes. All of the latter
average less than $50 of machinery and tools per equivalent worker.
Although the industry averages reported in Table 1 are quite informative,
they don't provide insight into how the composition of investment capital
varied with firm characteristics such as size and location. Hence, the
implications drawn from them might not apply to all classes of establishments
within the industries in question. Regressions with the various components of7
the total investment (here treated as the sum of fixed capital and
inventories) per unit of labor, and the proportions of the investment
accounted for by those components, as the dependent variables were accordingly
estimated over the Group II firms, and are presented in Table 2. The first
four regressions suggest that the total capital investment, and each of its
major subcomponents, increased relative to the labor input with the firm scale
of production in all manufacturing industries examined except shoes. Perhaps
more surprising is that, in industries other than textiles, the share of the
capital investment allocated to fixed capital decreased with establishment
size, as did the amount of investment in machinery and tools relative to that
in inventories. The fixed capital share of a firm's investment also decreased
with the degree of urbanization in the county in which the firm was located.
Thus, in most industries, the larger firms employed greater amounts of fixed
capital per unit of labor than their smaller competitors, but they were even
more extensive users, both relatively and absolutely, of inventories and
working capital in general.'°
These regressions appear to support and extend the interpretations drawn
from the industry—specific averages. Not only were the proportions of the
firm investments in inventories quite large in industries other than textiles,
but they were especially so in the larger firms whose development has often
been linked to industrialization. What explains this observed relationship
between the composition of the capital investment and the size of firms?
There are a number of hypotheses but the evidence does not allow us to clearly
distinguish between them. One possibility is that larger firms enjoyed, on
average, lower—cost access to short—term credit than did small establishments,
and were therefore led to invest relatively more in working capital. They







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These regressions were estimated over all of the Group II firms in the
1832 sample that supplied the relevant information, with the exceptions of
firms that reported no investment in structures and land, no investment in
machinery and tools, or operating fewer than seven months a year. The
t—statistics appear within parentheses below the corresponding regression
coefficients. The "urbanization rate" variable is defined for the county in
which the firm was located as the proportion of the population in 1830 that
resided in cities of 2500 or more people. The "part—tii dummy" is set equal
to 0 for those firms that reported operating at least 11 months a year. The
dummy is set to 1 for all other firms. Since many establishments failed to
indicate what portion of the year they operated, this variable seems likely to
suffer from a significant measurement error.9
supplied funds to their regular contacts, being easier to monitor, or being
less risky borrowers. Another theory is that larger firms had a relatively
greater demand for working capital, perhaps because they were more risk averse
about running out of inventories and being compelled to shut down, or found it
advantageous to hold larger stocks of inventories and offer more credit when
dealing in greater quantities and with more distant customers.
A third response to the statistical finding might be to label it an
artifact. Since manufacturing establishments don't always operate at full
capacity, and working capital is more directly related to current output
levels than fixed capital, one would generally expect to observe some positive
correlation between the current output of firms and their ratio of working to
fixed capital. This effect does not seem to provide an adequate explanation
of the regression results, however, because the labor input is also closely
linked to current output, and thus the same logic would predict an increase in
the ratio of labor to fixed capital with firm size, rather than the estimated
decrease.
A final piece of evidence that bears on the issues of whether and why the
working capital increased with firm size is provided by firm data on the
extension of credit. Regressions were estimated with the proportion of output
sold on credit as the dependent variable. One of these is presented below
without the industry dummies, which were jointly insignificant.
Proportion of Output Sold on Credit =
Intercept 0,778 (5.49)
Log (#ofemployees) 0.012 (O.3l)
Urbanization Rate 0.569 (—1.92)
Proportion of
Output Sold Locally —0.252(—344)10
Interaction between
Urbanization and
Log (#ofemployees) 0.199 (2.38)
N =224 =0.325
This regression conforms well with the view that the utilization of
working capital grew disproportionately with the size of firm, and lends some
support to each of the hypotheses concerned with that pattern. The negative
coefficient on the proportion of output sold locally may indicate that as
firms expanded to serve broader markets, they were driven to extend more
credit (demand more working capital) in order, perhaps, to compete more
successfully for buyers who preferred to delay payment until after delivery.
Alternatively, the sign on the coefficient could arise from those firms that
sold outside the local areas having cheaper access to short—term credit,
through the merchants and other substantial traders that they presumably dealt
with more frequently. The positive relationship between size of firm and the
proportion sold on credit, particularly strong in urban counties, also seems
consistent with each of the theories. Larger firms might be expected to have
both been involved in disproportionately more of the large—bloc transactions
that tend to be carried out on credit rather than in cash, and faced lower
credit costs. Urbanization appears to have been associated with a decrease in
the proportion of output sold on credit among small firms, but an increase
among large establishments. This pattern might be attributable to firms in
rural areas knowing more about their individual customers (consumers of
product) that bought directly from them than did their counterparts in the
city. For the larger firms, the greater the degree of urbanization in the
county, the greater the probability that they would be dealing with merchants
or other established middlemen that were more likely to provide short—term1].
loans and delay payment for goods.1°
Conclusions
This paper has sought to document the general quantitative importance of
manufacturing investment in working capital during the early stages of U.S.
industrialization. Another objective has been to emphasize the sharp varia-
tion across industries in the composition of their capital investments, and
more generally, in the factor intensities of their operations. In particular,
some major industries of the era, such as cotton textiles, wool textiles, and
paper, seem to have been relatively intensive in fixed capital, while most of
the others appear to have been intensive in working capital or labor. The
difference in capital requirements between the two classes of industries is of
special interest here, because of its implications for understanding why
certain industries became concentrated in the areas and regions they did, and
the degrees to which they were adversely affected by the limited availability
of long—term loans. Cotton textile firms, for example, may have tended to
cluster in New England, because that region's developed financial markets and
institutions provided long—term capital at lower cost. Manufacturers of hats
and shoes, however, would have tended toward areas where short—term credit and
the desired classes of workers were relatively abundant.'1
The other major argument of this paper has been that most of the
manufacturing industries examined had quite modest investments in machinery
and tools per unit of labor. Although the value of this ratio tended to
increase with firm size, the evidence serves to undercut the notion that the
early period of industrialization was based on a proliferation of new,
machinery—intensive technologies. On the contrary, the general dominance of
the working capital share of investment, as well as its positive association12
with firm size, seems to suggest that the expansion of markets may have played
the principal role in spurring industrial development.13
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